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Historical Sociology in International Relations: 













Over the last twenty years, historical sociology has become an increasingly conspicuous part 
of the broader field of International Relations (IR) theory, with advocates making a series of 
interventions in subjects as diverse as the origins and varieties of international systems over 
time and place, to work on the co-constitutive relationship between the international realm 
and state-society relations in processes of radical change. However, even as historical 
sociology in IR (HSIR) has produced substantial gains, so there has also been a concomitant 
watering down of the underlying approach itself. As a result, it is no longer clear what 
exactly HSIR entails: should it be seen as operating within the existing pool of available 
theories or as an attempt to reconvene the discipline on new foundations? This article sets out 
an identifiable set of assumptions and precepts for HSIR based on deep ontological realism, 
epistemological relationism, a methodological free range, and an overt normative 
engagement with the events and processes that make up contemporary world politics. As 
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Thirty-five years ago, James Rosenau (1969) made an eloquent case for a stock-taking 
exercise which could clarify the principal aims, concepts and methods of the emerging field 
of foreign policy analysis (FPA). Rosenau wrote (1969: 1), 
Every field of enquiry goes through an important and necessary stage during which 
scholars turn their attention to the kind of enterprise in which they are engaged. After 
a prolonged period of concern with substantive matters, self-consciousness of purpose 
develops and questions arise about the road that has been travelled to date and the 
direction which enquiry should follow in the future. At this point, histories of the field 
are written, exploration of its boundaries are undertaken, methods of research are 
sensitized, and the requirements of further theoretical concepts are re-examined. 
While it is not clear whether this process of maturation constitutes “healthy fervent” 
or “hopeless confusion”, the nature and limits of the field eventually emerge with 
greater clarity, thus enabling its practitioners to move on to the central task of 
accumulating knowledge through the investigation and interpretation of substantive 
materials.  
 
This article is a Rosenau-inspired stock-taking exercise into the use of historical sociology in 
International Relations (HSIR). Neither the broader enterprise of historical sociology nor the 
more particular orientations of HSIR are, of course, the FPA’s of their day. Historical 
sociology can be seen as at least two-centuries old (albeit depending to some extent on when 
and where you start counting) – an attempt by economists, philosophers of history and 
nascent sociologists to provide a historically sensitive, yet generally applicable, account of 
the emergence of capitalism, industrialisation, rationalism, bureaucratisation, urbanisation 
                                                 
* This article is a revised version of a paper presented at a meeting organised by the BISA 
working group on Historical Sociology and International Relations at Goldsmiths College in 
September 2005 and a panel held at the BISA annual conference at St Andrews in December 
2005. Many thanks to fellow panellists and participants at both events and, in particular, to 
Justin Rosenberg, Robbie Shilliam, Douglas Bulloch, Mike Levin, John Hobson, Bryan 
Mabee and Fred Halliday for comments on earlier drafts.  
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and other core features of the modern world.1 Although the place of historical sociology 
within sociology suffered from the broader discipline’s diversion into abstract theorising and 
its turf-wars with cognate rivals, historical sociology experienced something of a renaissance 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, around the time that a wave of self-consciously 
historical sociological work began to appear in IR.2 Over the last twenty years, the nexus 
between these two fields – historical sociology and IR – has borne substantial fruit: analysis 
of the origins and varieties of international systems over time and place (Watson 1992, 
Spruyt 1994, Buzan and Little 2000), exposure of the ‘myth of 1648’ (Osiander 2001, 
Teschke 2003), analysis of the non-Western origins of the contemporary world system 
(Wallerstein 1995, Gills 2002, Hobson 2004), work on the co-constitutive relationship 
between the international realm and state-society relations in processes of radical change 
(Halliday 1999, Lawson 2005a), examination of the social logic of international financial 
orders (Seabrooke 2006), and exploration of the international dimensions of modernity itself 
(Rosenberg 1994a, 2006). HSIR is now a formally recognised, if still minority, approach 
within the discipline.  
 In which case, why the need for a stock-take? The answer is hinted at by Rosenau 
(1969: 1): ‘After a prolonged period of concern with substantive matters, self-consciousness 
of purpose develops and questions arise about the road that has been travelled to date and the 
direction which enquiry should follow in the future’. So it is with HSIR. Even as substantial 
gains have been made, there has been a concomitant watering down of the underlying 
approach itself. HSIR seems to be sweeping up refugees from IR’s methodological wars just 
as historical sociology embraced those exiled by sociology’s internecine struggles thirty years 
ago. As a result, it is no longer clear, if it ever was, what exactly HSIR entails: should it be 
seen as operating within the existing pool of available IR theories – as an attempt to join the 
rank and file of IR’s puzzle-breakers, problem-solvers and safe-crackers? Or is HSIR better 
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seen as an attempt to reconvene the discipline on entirely new foundations, perhaps 
reorienting IR more towards sociology and away from its current infatuation with 
economics?3 In somewhat cruder IR terms, are HSIR-ers better seen as bandwagoners or 
revisionists?  
 Failure to provide a consistent answer to these fundamental questions has contributed 
to a process of dilution in which HSIR has come to be seen as a catch-all term for any work 
that contains historical, sociological and international sensitivities. There is a danger that, as 
currently constituted, HSIR’s greatest strengths – its broad purview, its explanatory reach, 
and its balance between big ideas and empirical graft – could also become its principal 
weakness, engendering a lack of clarity that could reduce its overall value.4 Perhaps it is time 
to come clean about just what HSIR is about – on the grounds of intellectual honesty if 
nothing else. Caveat emptor!5 
HSIR’s ‘anything goes’ approach has been somewhat augmented by catholic 
tendencies within HSIR itself. Hence, a prominent advocate, John Hobson (2002), argues that 
there are seven types of HSIR, ranging from post-modernists to structural realists – quite a 
catch. At the same time, Hobden (2002) and Hobson (2006) claim that HSIR is the über-
approach to IR, a method followed by almost all IR scholars before the Waltzian ahistoricist 
detour. While this descriptive definition has certainly been of value during the infancy of 
HSIR when alliances, for prudence sake, were made when and where they could be, there is a 
danger that taking such a Feyerabend-ian ‘anything goes’ approach privileges inclusivity 
above coherence, and risks uprooting HSIR from its own heritage in classical social theory.6 
If HSIR is to become a mature feature within the broad landscape of contemporary IR theory, 
we need a better understanding of what it is, how it operates and where its boundaries lie.  
 In the first instance, therefore, this article is an attempt to ascertain just what HSIR’s 
‘domain assumptions’ (Gouldner 1970) are. It asks whether HSIR is best seen as a vocation, 
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as a research programme or as an open society; whether it presupposes a particular ontology, 
epistemology, methodology or substantive agenda; what its relationship is and should be to 
other IR paradigms; and which other disciplines should be seen as its friends, siblings or 
cousins, estranged or otherwise. Providing some preliminary responses to these questions 
should allow, as Rosenau puts it (1969: 1), ‘the nature and limits of the field to emerge with 
greater clarity’. In the final analysis, the principal pay-off of HSIR will emerge from its 
substantive output. But if this enterprise is to achieve its widest possible impact, substantive 
work needs to be premised on an identifiable set of assumptions and precepts which are 
commonly shared and widely accepted.7 
 
 
Historical sociology as an open society 
 
Historical sociology is as much a part of world history, institutional analysis and 
development economics as it is a sub-section of sociology, International Relations and 
comparative politics. Historical sociology, therefore, has necessarily open borders. For HSIR, 
this is especially important. In its broadest sense, historical sociology aims to unravel the 
complexity that lies behind the interaction between social action (both deliberate and 
unintentional) and structural forces (socially constructed but with an enduring authority and 
dynamic of their own). Hence, for HSIR-ers, international factors are juxtaposed, conjoined 
and connected with domestic variables with the aim of finding patterns that explain 
international processes: the general and regional crisis that provoke wars, varieties of 
capitalist development, forms of imperialism and so on.  
 The principal benefit of historical sociology in IR is clear – it emboldens what Justin 
Rosenberg (1994b) calls ‘the international imagination’. As numerous scholars have pointed 
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out, much of mainstream International Relations is curiously unhistorical. In fact, realism (in 
all its variants) and neoliberal institutionalism share a predilection for seeing the international 
realm, at least in terms of its structural dimension, as unchanging, in other words as existing 
outside history. Taking a static picture of the structure of world politics – the sovereign 
states-system – irons out differences between political units, omits other global structural 
forces such as capitalism and reduces agency to the unit-level musings of statesmen, 
financiers and generals. In this way, mainstream IR has systematically truncated the study of 
world politics by introducing a levels of analysis parlour game which reifies social processes 
and social facts – states, the market, sovereignty – as timeless analytical (and ultimately as 
ontological) entities. In this way, much IR theory becomes home to what we might call a 
‘continuist mystique’ in which the past is ransacked in order to explain the present. Thus, the 
contest between Athens and Sparta is transplanted to the Cold War in order to elucidate the 
stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union; all wars, whether they be guerrilla 
insurgencies or total conflicts, are explained by international anarchy; and all political units – 
city-states, nomadic tribes, empires, nation-states and transnational alliances – are 
functionally undifferentiated. What John Hobson (2002) describes as a ‘gigantic optical 
illusion’ generates an isomorphic homology of social kinds.  
 Historical sociology, which was in its post-war guise in part a reaction to the timeless, 
spaceless (and specious) general theory associated with Parsonian structural-functionalism, is 
well suited to disentangling the synchronic mystique of much mainstream IR. Over the last 
twenty years, HSIR has produced numerous works which have picked away at neorealist and 
institutionalist assumptions about the international realm. Justin Rosenberg (1994a, 2006) has 
focused on the origins of modernity itself, laying bare the crude separation of state from 
society and states from markets carried out by political realism. John Hobson (2004) has 
demonstrated the importance of understanding the global, long-term genesis of the modern 
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states-system. Fred Halliday (1999) has, in numerous texts, demonstrated the importance of 
various forms of social change in the making of the modern world, while scholars as far 
removed as the critical theorist Andrew Linklater (1998) and the Marxist Benno Teschke 
(2003) have sought to contextualize and demythologize the foundational myth of Westphalia. 
Barry Buzan and Richard Little (2000) have shown in a detailed study how the international 
system changes in form and content according to time and place. 
 But it is not only dyed in the wool HSIR-ers who are contributing to this form of 
research. Hence, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald (1996) have used a historically 
sensitive, comparative analysis to show how the non-use of nuclear and chemical weapons 
has, in large part, evolved over the last century from the interplay between a number of 
domestic and international factors, constructing a standard of civilization that prohibits the 
use of these weapons. Similarly, Martha Finnemore (1996, 2003) has illustrated how the 
norm of humanitarian intervention has been constructed over time, starting with the 
protection of Christians from persecution by the Ottoman Empire, and carried via the fight 
against slavery and decolonization into a universal concept of humanity. Other constructivists 
such as Christian Reus-Smit (1999) and Michael Barnett (2002) also adopt a historical 
sociological take on the institutional underpinnings of international orders and on the 
changing functions of international organizations respectively. Like these constructivists, a 
number of neo-classical realists such as Fareed Zakaria (1999), Randall Schweller (1998), 
William Wohlforth (1993), Thomas Christensen (1997) and Jennifer Sterling-Folker (2002) 
are looking at how the systemic pressures afforded by anarchy are translated through unit-
level intervening variables, ranging from perceptions to civil-military relations. These 
scholars show that, without building in scope for ideology, perception, domestic state-society 
relations and the like, structural realism fails to explain why states balance or bandwagon, 
hide or transcend, chain-gang or buck-pass.  
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 The work of these constructivists and neo-classical realists, allied to the efforts of 
other IR notables such as Barry Buzan (2004), John Ikenberry (2003) and Stephen Krasner 
(1999), who also apply historical sociological methods within the English School, liberal and 
realist traditions respectively, is not always self-consciously written as historical sociology. 
Yet it could be described as such in that each of these studies is rooted in a diachronic 
understanding of the international realm, looking at how social action and social structures, 
and the social facts engendered by interaction between these two spheres, change over time, 
inhabiting a domain of both continuity and disjuncture. In the first instance, such works are 
empirically grounded studies of ‘sufficient similarity’, using several cases to generate causal 
patterns and wider inferences beyond either a universalistic program or a collapse into 
indeterminacy. As such, these studies take place within a research tradition dating back to 
Max Weber’s attempt to provide an empirically rich, comparative study of social facts which 
he used as a means to generate and evaluate a general argument. This conjoining of 
interpretation and explanation (Verstehende Erklärung) uses awareness of particular contexts 
in order to derive a nuanced, causal explanation of ideal-types that potentially contains a 
wider import. It is this approach that, I argue, contains fertile ground for the study of world 
politics. By tacking between empirical data, conceptual abstractions and causal explanations, 
as Michael Mann (1986) puts it, ‘carrying out a constant conversation between the evidence 
and one’s theory’, it is possible to refine and refute, engage with and accumulate knowledge.  
 Of course, historical sociologists beyond IR’s disciplinary boundaries have also 
contributed to our understanding of international processes. Hence, Michael Mann (1986, 
1993) includes numerous international processes, including militarism, in his account of 
world historical development, while Charles Tilly (1988) has helped to show the importance 
of warfare and capital accumulation to processes of state formation. These border raids create 
opportunities for what Bruce Carruthers (2005) calls ‘constructive misbehaviour’ – the 
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chance for intellectual entrepreneurs to act as translators, borrowing concepts and data from 
one academic discipline and introducing it into another.8 This act of arbitrage, when it is done 
well, reduces levels of ‘intellectual autism’ (Steinmetz: 2005) – the narrowing of a field 
under the watchful scrutiny of academic homeland security agents. What is more, 
disciplinary travelling can help to deconstruct the mythical qualities of analytical shorthands 
(such as the state, society or anarchy) which are often reified, in the interests of little more 
than academic partitioning, as ontological distinctions. 
 However, it is important not to get too carried away with openness and fluidity both 
within disciplines and between them. Interdisciplinarity can engender thinness and sloppiness 
as well as promote depth and rigour. Indeed, some of historical sociology’s raiding parties on 
various disciplines, including IR, has seen the misapplication of outdated concepts and 
theoretical toolkits.9 It is, perhaps, inherent in interdisciplinary work that it is attracted to the 
mainstream of another subject rather than to the more interesting debates that lie beneath the 
surface. Equally, hastening to interdisciplinarity can collapse the distinction between 
incommensurability and incompatibility. While the former conceives of HSIR as being 
carried out within a relatively closed or autonomous research community, co-existing 
peacefully (if somewhat estranged) from other IR paradigms, the latter sees HSIR in open 
conflict with rival approaches, basing its raison d’être on contesting, refuting and falsifying 
some of IR’s foundational claims. In this sense, it is important not to obscure root-and-branch 
differences lest bridge-building become a metaphor for cannibalism, a means of amplifying 
the narcissism of small differences, or of generating dilettantism. Better, perhaps, to try to 
coax the broad field of HSIR into two major ideal-types which, with apologies to Isaiah 






Isaih Berlin’s (1953) essay – Hedgehogs and Foxes – distinguished between those who orient 
research around one big idea (Hedgehogs) and those who are sceptical of such ventures, 
preferring instead smaller scale interventions into particular fields (Foxes). Hedgehogs work 
from general abstractions to empirical material (when and where they deign to do so). This is 
the stuff of grand theory, of foundational macro-schema operating above the rudiments, and 
to some extent the impediments, of events, action and experience. Hedgehog research – in 
long-hand what we might describe as historically-nuanced social theory – stems from a 
rejection of induction as a means of generating verifiable, or refutable, social theory.11 
Candidates include the Wallersteinian (1995) world-systems approach, Giddens’ (1991) 
evocation of globalisation as the deep structure of the contemporary world, and Rosenberg’s 
(2006) concept of uneven and combined development, all attempts to provide a hypo-
deductive, determinate modus operandi within which the principal contours of world history 
can be derived. Hedgehogs bare a family resemblance to the Austrian School of economists, 
centred around Carl Menger, who argued in the latter part of the nineteenth century that only 
deductive, nomological, abstract reasoning would produce ‘proper’ theory that could generate 
universally applicable laws.12 Karl Popper (1957: 38), one of the progenitors of the 
nomological method, explains its virtues with his customary élan, ‘theories are nets cast to 
catch what we call the world: to rationalise, to explain and to master it we endeavour to make 
the mesh ever finer and finer’.13  
 The strengths of such theorising are easy to distinguish – they are grand in scale and 
ambition; often original, imaginative and fertile schema which generate and sustain 
significant research programmes. As such, they are exemplars of what Kuhn (1962) calls 
‘extraordinary research’. Grand theory is often allied to parsimony and elegance, and those 
who pull-off such a venture stand squarely on the shoulders of the illustrious theorisers of the 
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nineteenth century. However, the weaknesses of abstracted grand theory, particularly in 
historical sociology, are also glaring. By focusing on (often single) underling determinants, 
these theorists tend to omit the range of factors, long-term and short-term, material and 
ideational, economic, social and political, that make up processes of large-scale change. This 
produces a gap between theoretical assertions (analytical scope conditions), and historical 
analysis (temporal and spatial scope conditions) which threatens to make the former static 
rather than dynamic, and the story of human history simple rather than complex. Such a 
theory cannot be exhaustive; rather, it runs the risk of delivering internal elegance only at the 
cost of its analytical punch.14  
 All too often, hedgehogs overcome anomalies by pushing their idea into domains for 
which it is ill-equipped to cope. A good example of this is provided by contemporary 
neorealism. Following the end of the Cold War, neorealists struggled to explain the relatively 
peaceful change from a system of bipolarity to unipolarity.15 Although some advocates 
attempted a salvaging job on this apparent incongruity,16 they strained to maintain the 
efficacy of the theory given the apparent absence of great power balancing since 1989. The 
result has been an increasingly fractious debate over the relative stability and durability of 
unipolarity, the concept of soft balancing, and, most notably, a ‘back to the future’ scramble 
in which many realists have resurrected classical theorists in order to re-introduce unit-level 
dimensions that were exorcised from the approach by Waltz and others.17 Given these two 
major discrepancies in neorealist theory – peaceful systemic change and an apparently stable 
unipolarity – it is more likely that such debates have marked a retreat from neorealism rather 
than a modification or extension of its core precepts. As such, they represent the degeneration 
rather than the progression of neorealism as a research programme, a pertinent illustration of 
the tendency of hedgehogs to swallow or slide away from unhelpful empirical anomalies 
rather than to ditch an idea which seems to be have been falsified.18  
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 It is doubtful whether the determinate theories offered by hedgehogs can capture the 
particularity of world historical development in all its intricacies, quirks and twists, at least 
not in the depth required or with sufficient detail. To do so requires reducing history to a 
secondary role, what Stanley Hoffman (1960: 135) calls, ‘a grab-bag from which each 
advocate pulls out a “lesson” to prove his point’. If world history is messy, complex and at 
times, contradictory, then a multi-causal analysis that finds common patterns, trends and 
trajectories from empirical analysis rather than one which seeks to impose a monolithic order 
on historical ambiguities is likely to yield a richer picture. After all, once they are applied, 
general abstractions soon reach their limits. And sometimes the search for a master process 
can seem akin to a search for the mind of God, a theistically driven desire for there to be 
intelligent design amidst the flotsam and jetsam of world history. 
 The Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori (1970) makes this point well. For 
Sartori, at the extreme edge of abstraction lies the possibility of ‘concept stretching’ or 
‘straining’ towards vague, amorphous crystallizations, pseudo-universals without either 
precision or purchase – anarchy and globalisation being two such examples.19 The result is 
abstracted short-cuts leading to empirical short-circuits, failed attempts to apply rigid rules to 
a changing, multi-faceted and complex world. By conducting theory ‘at first remove’ and by 
focusing on the structural dimensions of world historical development, such analysis is 
infused with a reductionism that loses touch with the uncertainty and, most crucially, the 
agency that lies at the heart of processes of large-scale change. But agency can neither be 
ignored nor merely grafted onto an existing structural theory: the actions of individuals, 
groups, organisations and the like play a formative role in the creation, process and resolution 
of processes of change. Mikhail Gorbachev was not a bit part player in the collapse of the 
Soviet Empire, nor was Bill Clinton in the construction of the liberal post-Cold War 
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settlement, and nor is President Bush and his entourage in the extension of the US imperium 
today.  
  Far from being the passive bearers (Träger) of overbearing structures, human agency 
is, at least in part, constitutive of processes of social change. Yet abstracted grand theorists 
give us only a partial picture – one that, albeit unintentionally, can look like an inevitable tale 
or a pre-determined narrative. This entails not just a loss of agency, but also a failure to grasp 
the second aspect of what Giddens (1984) calls the ‘double hermeneutic’ – the fact that the 
theories that people use to make sense of social processes enter reflexively into the very 
causal processes which they are theorising.20 Abstracted theory which relies on others ‘under-
labouring’ can produce little more than interpretation of others interpretations, what John 
Goldthorpe (1991: 211-230) calls ‘incomplete speculations’, ‘pick and mix raids on history’s 
sweetshop’. All theories need to simplify reality in order to function as theories, but on 




Foxes, the second broad group of historical sociologists, can be seen as sociologically 
oriented historians, those with their roots in idiographic methods. For most such historians, 
the task of assigning patterns to history, let alone conducting any search for its determinant 
trends, is futile, more likely to generate fools gold than findings of real value. As Robert 
Nisbet (1969: 240-241) puts it, 
 History in any substantive sense is plural. It is diverse, multiple, and particular. There 
 have been innumerable histories since the first history of the first human group 
 began … not only are there many histories, there are many chronologies, many 
 times … many histories, many areas, many times! The mind boggles at the task of 
 encapsulating such diversity within any empirically clear formula or synthesis. It 




Given this starting point, the best that the researcher can achieve is what Michael Mann 
(1986: 4) calls ‘proximate method’ or what Jean-Paul Sartre (in Smith 1991: 231) labels as 
‘rational disorder’ – an assemblage of history’s multiple vectors into a kind of organised 
mess. After all (Mann 1986: 4), ‘societies are always much messier than our theories of 
them’, and contingency, accident and indeterminacy are constant companions to world 
historical processes. For Mann and other historical sociologists in this bracket, there can be 
no story of ultimate primacy. Embracing the complexity of world history and accepting 
multiple patterns of causation tends towards an inductive approach that builds from history to 
mid-range abstractions.21 The benefits of such an approach are clear – in terms of nuance, 
detail and sensitivity, historical sociology of this type is unrivalled. 
 However, such an approach also has its downsides. By stressing contingency, 
accident and particularity, there is a possibility that bigger, more important commonalities are 
missed. At the very least, this runs the risk of ‘overdetermination’ – the provision of a 
shopping list of causes that includes all sorts of weak or insignificant factors in a vain attempt 
to provide a ‘complete’ explanation. Worse still, such an approach can collapse into 
arbitrariness, incoherence, ad-hocery, and ultimately, into negativity, becoming analysis 
rather than theory, and sacrificing depth for broadness. Just because the world is complex, it 
does not mean that it is unknowable. Even if we can not see things as they ‘really are’, it is 
still possible to conjure appropriate shorthands and metaphors that provide compelling 
narratives into world history’s gloaming. Most of the time, as Eric Ringmar (1996) points 
out, the research process of ‘seeing as’ encounters a relatively stable set of understandings 
and meanings. And there should be little inhibition to making a judgement that prefers one 
explanation over another. Accepting particularity does not, therefore, entail abandoning the 
attempt to evaluate rival truth claims into the causal rhythms that punctuate world historical 
processes. Rather, the generation of causal narratives provides a means of telling superior 
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stories – studies of causation that seek to explain the most important elements within 
complex social processes and to make sense of structural production, reproduction, reform 
and transformation.22 
 Nisbet and other researchers in this mould are surely right to insist that social 
explanation tally closely with historical records. Here it is worth returning again to the work 
of Giovanni Sartori (1970). Sartori proposed that social science works within a ladder of 
abstraction ranging from general abstractions (genus) to mid-level taxonomies (class) to 
empirical analysis (species). For Sartori, social scientists would be best served by starting 
with medium-level abstractions or hypothesis and working up and down the ladder of 
abstraction, testing whether their hunches fit both with more general concepts, and with the 
available empirical material. For Sartori, this process of ‘conceptual travelling’ generates 
‘fact-storing containers’ (empirical universals) which are geared at unravelling the interplay 
between homogeneity and heterogeneity, and which combine explanatory purchase with a 
high level of empirical content. Subsequently renamed by David Collier and James Mahon 
(1993) as a ‘ladder of generality’, Sartori’s method seems particularly well suited to historical 
sociology, allowing concepts, categories and causal regularities to be properly assessed over 
time and space, and in the process generating workable, theoretically compelling taxonomies 
and classificatory schemas. 
 
Lumpers and splitters, sweepers and detailers 
 
It is important to note that any hard distinction between these two ideal-types is unlikely to be 
carried through in practice. Rather, the choice to be made is one of degree – as John Lewis 
Gaddis (2001) argues, the difference between ‘embedded theory’ as practised by historians in 
which theory is subordinated to the overarching narrative, and ‘encompassing theory’, which 
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subordinates narrative to theoretical needs, is often one of aesthetics rather than principle. To 
add a degree of precision, therefore, to our ideal-types, we may want to further nuance these 
categories. Figure 1 attempts to do just this – providing a basic grouping of historical 
sociologists divided by two axis: the x axis runs between lumpers (holists) and splitters 
(instrumentalists), and the y axis between sweepers (abstractors) and detailers (historians). 
What this sub-division entails is four basic camps: in the top-left quadrant (lumpers/ 
sweepers) can be found (neo)Marxists and structural functionalists; in the bottom-left 
(lumpers/detailers) quadrant are predominantly world historians; in the bottom-right quadrant 
(detailers/splitters) lie (neo)Weberians; and the top-right quadrant (sweepers/splitters) is 
occupied by advocates of rational choice, network analysis and other, mainly US-dominated, 
methodological pursuits.  
 
 Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
 
 Figure 2 provides a more detailed mapping exercise which adds a further layer of 
subtlety to these broad categorisations. By looking at how individual scholars map onto these 
two axis, it is possible to gauge the substantial variation within historical sociology. 
Orientation within the mapping exercise is best begun via its extreme edges. At the furthest 
remove of the sweepers/lumpers is Talcott Parsons, doyen of structural functionalism. 
Towards the central point of this quadrant can be found Benno Teschke, an IR based neo-
Marxist who incorporates substantive historical research and a fair degree of agency in his 
analysis. Those who retain a firmer attachment to holism or structuralism, while also 
maintaining a degree of historical nuance, such as Theda Skocpol and Barrington Moore, can 
be found further along the west of the y axis.  
 Moving counter-clockwise into the bottom-left corner of the grid, the extremity is 
marked by Fernand Braudel – patrician of the Annales School of French historians who were 
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much taking with the slow-moving impact of geography and demography on world historical 
development.23 Braudel’s evocation of the longue durée, change which takes place over eons, 
marks him out as a lumper, but the extraordinarily richness of his historical research – each 
volume of The Mediterranean (1972) alone runs to over a thousand pages – marks Braudel as 
a consummate detailer. Moving east along the x axis takes one away from structuralism and 
towards instrumentalism, while moving up the y axis denotes a higher degree of abstraction. 
Hence, a researcher who focuses on the structural impact of demographic change, Jack 
Goldstone, is only just contained within this quadrant, while John Hobson, a world historian 
much influenced by Weberianism can be found edging towards the mid-point of the grid – 
Hobson’s research attempts to conjoin detailing and lumping, and to link instrumentalism 
with a degree of conceptual abstraction.  
 Moving once more counter-clockwise around the grid we come to the bottom-right 
quadrant represented by splitters/detailers. At the furthest edge of this quadrant is E.P. 
Thompson, the British ‘historian from below’, who consistently emphasised the importance 
of taking individuals and individual agency as the basis for ‘real’ history.24 Interestingly, 
almost directly above Thompson can be found Michael Mann’s recent work on fascism. 
Mann has followed a trajectory steadily eastwards across the grid, from the first volume of 
Sources of Social Power (SSP) which places him, albeit marginally, among the lumpers and 
detailers, to Volume II of SSP in which Mann moves just across the border into 
splitters/detailers and, most recently, towards the edge of this quadrant, a move predicated by 
Mann’s shift towards thick description and instrumentalism. Towards the centre of this 
quadrant can be found a number of prominent neo-Weberian historical sociologists including 
Anthony Giddens, Norbert Elias, and straying towards the instrumentalist hinterland of the x 
axis, Charles Tilly. 
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 Finally, moving into the top-right corner of the grid delineates the space occupied by 
abstractors/splitters. The farthest position here is taken up by Michael Hechter and Edgar 
Kiser, well known for their avocation of a rational choice strand within historical sociology. 
This quadrant is less well occupied than the others – indicative of the fact that historical 
sociology is not particularly well suited to abstractions such as rational choice, particularly 
when this is conjoined with instrumentalism and methodological individualism.25 Towards 
the centre of this quadrant lie some IR scholars who can be described as HSIR-ers even if 
they do not often wear the label explicitly.  
 This grid indicates two key points: first, there is considerable variation within 
historical sociology. Historical sociologists appear as foxes and hedgehogs, lumpers and 
splitters, sweepers and detailers on a broad continuum between universality and particularity, 
thick description and the generation of concrete universals. Historical sociology, therefore, is 
not a homogenous field in which it is possible to lay down definite border positions – the 
enterprise is a prototypical open society. Second, the grid indicates that one of the central 
tasks of historical sociology (perhaps the central task), is to perform a balancing act between 
theoretical and empirical work, and between recognising the complexity of the social world 
while at the same time ensuring that one does not become lost in minutiae – differentiating 
between normal abnormality and abnormal normality. This is the reason why C. Wright Mills 
appears at the centre of the diagram. Mills’ clarion call for a sociological enterprise that 
eschews both grand theory (abstraction without application) and abstracted empiricism 
(behaviouralist quantifications of human action) speaks directly to the historical sociological 
imagination – an imagination that, as Roland Dannreuther and James Kennedy point out in 





Historical Sociology as a research programme 
 
The preceding section argued that historical sociology is a broad church containing its fair 
share of zealots, converts and heretics. As it has developed, historical sociology has been 
applied within a number of formal disciplines and across a number of issue areas. Historical 
sociologists have asked important questions, probed at interesting puzzles, provided some 
compelling hypothesis, and produced an array of empirical studies on subjects as varied as 
the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and the development of manners. The promise of 
historical sociology, considered in this light, is rich indeed. Going beyond the broad 
parameters laid out above, this section delineatea some clear domains and guidelines within 
which advocates of HS can work. In other words, I am attempting to establish some basic 
ground rules for historical sociological work – as Larry Laudan (1977) would have it, ‘a set 
of ontological do’s and don’ts’. Or as Imre Lakatos (1970) prefers, as a research programme 




There is no flawless frame for the construction of theory. Indeed, as C. Wright Mills (1959) 
warns, working from a single ontology can create a ‘transhistorical straightjacket’ within 
which history is manipulated rather than given the chance to breathe. Nevertheless, the 
current ontological framework within which much social science operates, as Heikki 
Patomaki and Colin Wight (2000) point out, exerts a similar straightjacket on research. 
Patomaki and Wight claim that the current choice available to scholars is little more than that 
between two narrow forms of realism: realism as sense data (the empirical, phenomenal 
realism practiced by rationalists) and realism as language (the linguistic, inter-subjective 
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noumenal realism of post-positivists). From this perspective, reality is reduced either to 
immediate experience or to an object of discourse, creating a shared ontological ‘problem-
field’ buttressed by secondary epistemological differences.  
 The focus of contemporary historical sociologists, just as was the case for classical 
social theorists, is somewhat different than this straightjacket allows, centring on the 
underlying reality that provides the environment for everyday action, events and processes. 
This deep-lying ontological realism (Bhaskar 1979, 1986; Collier 1994; Hollis 1994; Hacking 
1999), is primarily concerned with the principal structures that constrain and enable surface 
level experience and perceptions – the capabilities, tendencies and potentials that, to some 
extent, lie beyond individual understanding and agency.27 The aim of historical sociology has 
in the past, and should be today, to illuminate these structures and tendencies. This is the 
reason why so many historical sociologists have focused their attention on processes of 
radical change, or what Mann (1986) calls ‘neo-episodic moments’ – it is at precisely at these 
instances that structural tendencies are revealed, reproduced, reaffirmed, reformed or cast 
anew.28 As Dennis Smith (1991: 1) puts it, ‘one of historical sociology’s objectives should be 
to distinguish between open doors and brick walls, and to discover whether, how, and with 
what consequences walls may be removed’. 
 Historical sociology, therefore, offers as one of its central imperatives an explanation 
of historical development itself. Recognising the complexity of world historical processes 
and agreeing that numerous causes lie behind what Charles Tilly (1984) calls ‘master-
processes’ does not mean abdication from the central task of establishing the prime movers 
that orchestrate these processes and the principal colours that define them. But rather than 
subsuming or cloaking findings within readily available Hempelian ‘covering laws’, 
historical sociology aims to provide conceptual abstractions that, when conjoined with 
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empirical work, provide explanatory contours that lie beyond and beneath the lurches and 




A commitment to deep realism is the first dimension within the historical sociological 
research programme. Equally important is the work on the sociology of knowledge carried 
out by Karl Mannheim (1960), Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967), and others, who 
conceive of knowledge gained into the social world as inherently relational rather than 
isolated or free-standing. Hence, the social world is revealed not through synchronic 
abstraction, but via diachronic conceptualisations. As Robert Nisbet (1969) writes, the 
tradition of social science in the west has, at least to some extent, emerged out of the Greek 
concern with physis – the study of the origins and growth of things. As a result, being, at least 
for classical social theorists, was a story of becoming – explaining change, development and 
growth become the central task of social theory. The medium by which to unravel the 
complex flows of these world historical processes was seen as causation. Hence, historical 
sociology became the task of establishing, pace Mannheim, principia media – the movement 
of social forms, relations and trends across time and place. This task, I think, can be seen as a 
sine qua non of historical sociology. Following from this, a secondary goal is to provide an 
account of order, hierarchy and priority which these causal flows subscribe to, evaluating 
between what Aristotle calls ‘necessary’ and ‘accidental’ causes, Weber described as 
‘adequate’ and ‘chance’ causation, and Nisbet describes as ‘original’, ‘formal’, ‘motor’ and 
‘final’ causes. This is the pursuit of principium medium (concrete determinate trends) – the 
apex of the causal staircase represented in Figure 3.  
 




 Historical sociology, therefore, operates with a dual foundational toolkit: deep 
ontological realism and epistemological relationism. It understands there to be an underlying 
social reality, but equally clearly understands that all social relations exist in constitutive 
inter-relation with others, hence the need to problematise difference, multiplicity and 
interactions, to go beyond immediate context and to transcend narrow viewpoints. Rather 
than compare reified, static social facts, this mode of research involves the study of the 
relations, linkages and processes that make up the social world. In the first instance, this 
involves a temporal extension into the past. But it also requires a concomitant examination of 
the spatial relationship between societies and social formations, in other words an inter-
societal or inter-social perspective. If there is a motif that lies behind historical sociology, it is 
‘never forget time and place’.  
 
Application, application, application 
 
Methodologically, historical sociology is promiscuous: historical sociology can be inductive 
or deductive, carried out at the macro, the meso or the micro levels, be based on constitutive 
or causal theory, and be conducted in a variety of guises: from ethnography to verstehen. At 
one extreme is the promotion of rational choice historical sociology by Michael Hechter 
(1992), Edgar Kiser (1996) and others (see the various contributions in Gould (ed.) 2005), an 
attempt which has spawned a wide-ranging meta-theoretical debate which, in turn, has 
prompted significant work on relationalism (Emirbayer 1997, Somers 1998, Nexon and 
Jackson 1999) path-dependency (Mahoney 2000, 2001; Goldstone 1998; Pierson 2004), 
temporality (Aminzade 1992, McDaniel (ed.) 1996, Sewell 2005), historical institutionalism 
(Powell and DiMaggio (eds.) 1991; Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth (eds.) 1992; Thelen 
2003, 2004;  Streeck and Thelen (eds.) 2005) and other such ventures. At the other extreme 
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stands cultural, post-colonial and other ‘third-wave’ historical sociologies, well captured in 
the work of Craig Calhoun (1996, 2003) and introduced into IR by Steve Smith (2002) and 
others.29  
 Ultimately, though, there is only one methodological stricture presupposed by 
historical sociology: that it is applied. Historical sociology offers a powerful one-two 
combination – history (a story of why things happened, when and how they did), allied to 
sociology (an explanation of why this is significant). It asks the simple but powerful question, 
‘so what’? Without application, historical sociology loses this double strength, at the same 
time minimising much of its value. Many contemporary debates in IR and other social 
sciences struggle in the face of battle scars caused by a century or more of turf wars in which 
borders have been constructed in order to seal off terrain and safeguard specialist knowledge. 
The result is a splintered social scientific enterprise in which analytical shorthands have been 
reified as ontological distinctions and disciplinary partitions have been mistaken for 
substantive ones. One of the benefits of historical sociology is the refusal to see these 
apparently incommensurable dichotomies as intractable. Hence, issues of agency-structure, 
macro-micro, positivism-post-positivism are conceived not as theoretical, ontological or 
methodological problems but as substantive ones – in other words as the study of how, in 
time and place, human agency is constituted within social structures. In this sense, agency 
does not lie beyond or outside history but in history.30 And rather than reinventing the 
Methodenstreit ad infinitum or philosophical parlour-games ad nauseum, historical sociology 
is rooted in the substantive application of social relations as they are constituted in time and 
place, followed by the examination of how far these social processes and social facts are 





Historical Sociology as a vocation 
 
Historical sociology’s methodological promiscuity is matched by the free-range of its 
substantive agenda. Although there has been a general predilection in historical sociology 
towards big issues – systemic change, processes of state formation, wars, revolutions and the 
like – this has not ruled out many smaller scale interventions into both meso-level and micro-
processes, a point Bryan Mabee makes strongly in his article for this forum. What has been 
common to historical sociology in all its guises is a concern with normative, politically 
engaged work concurrent with an intellectual engagement into method, theory and 
substantive issues – hence Theda Skocpol’s (2003) valorisation of historical sociology as ‘the 
doubly engaged social science’. In this sense, historical sociologists recognise that facts are 
value laden, but that values too are factually embedded. And as Patomaki and Wight (2000) 
observe, this leads to a simple desire to make values factually explained, and facts subject to 
critical evaluation. The result is a connection, or perhaps a reconnection, between the world 
of ethical deliberation and the world of causal processes far removed from the banalities of 
‘value-free’ abstract research programmes, ‘orphans of the scientific revolution’ (Puchala 
2003) as they are. Historical sociology stands in direct contrast to those approaches which, as 
Skocpol (2003: 412) notes, ‘conspire to know more and more about less and less’.  
 Hence a further critique of much of the contemporary academy, both in IR and 
beyond, is its confusion of ends and means, and the endorsement of a bureaucratic enterprise 
that serves to restrict intellectual freedom. The application of historical sociology as a 
vocation promises a double engagement (both political and intellectual) which marks a return 
to the concerns of classical social analysis. As such, the historical sociological imagination 
favours the analysis of substantive problems and issues rather than technical approaches 
premised and assessed on the basis of methodological purity. In this sense, historical 
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sociology is humanistic rather than abstract, seeking to connect the world of human agency 
and struggle with the apparently impersonal structural forces that seem to lie beyond our 
control. Historical sociology takes human relations and their articulation and crystallisation in 
real historical conditions as its central calling. Above all else, historical sociology promises 
the study of ‘we’ rather than ‘they’, or ‘it’. 
 HSIR is, therefore, not just an open society nor a research programme but a vocation 
progressing on several fronts simultaneously: a central group of researchers providing 
empirical and theoretical depth supplemented by a range of networks generating breadth and 
fostering creative synergies. The view of HSIR conceived here is, in metaphorical terms, a 
form of what Eurocrats call ‘subsidiarity’ – the academic equivalent of a Schengen agreement 
in which a core-group of researchers produce works within a well-conceived and broadly 
accepted corpus. Augmenting this hub is a series of spokes or networks that reach out to 
others, fostering ties and generating mutual competences. This is a project that speaks to the 
heart of the historical sociological imagination – respecting the particular intricacies of both 
history and academic specialisms, while at the same time remaining aware and committed to 
the common threads and interests that unite work in the classical social science tradition and 
which underpin a broader normative engagement with the stuff of world politics. The result, 
as Dennis Smith (1991: 78) puts it, is, at least ideally, a ‘process of never-ending 
exploration’. 
 It may be worth making one final remark lest the primary purpose of this article be 
lost amidst the preceding discussion. This stock-taking or ground clearing exercise has not 
been undertaken in order to engage in a lengthy bout of navel gazing, but with the intention 
of prompting a concerted period of substantive HSIR research. The French mathematician 
Henri Poincaré once chastised sociology as the ‘science with the most methods and the 
fewest results’. Above all else, historical sociology should be the study of concrete reality 
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(Wirklichkeitswissenschaft), an approach that asks new questions and develops an agenda for 
further research – as Craig Calhoun (2003: 437) puts it, ‘opening up vistas for 
understanding’. This is the principal reason for being open about the core dimensions of 
HSIR project – taking one step backwards in order to take two more forward. Thus, to some 
extent, having cleared the decks, it might be worth paying heed to the words of C. Wright 
Mills (1959: 124), perhaps the most passionate advocate and exponent of the classical social 
scientific method,  
 Every man his own methodologist!  
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1 In this article, I use the term historical sociology interchangeably with ‘classical social 
theory’ to make the point that historical sociology is less a sub-field of sociology than its very 
core. As such, historical sociology is at the heart of what C. Wright Mills (1959) evocatively 
calls ‘the sociological imagination’. On the development of historical sociology as a self-
aware body of work, see Abrams (1982), Skocpol (ed.) (1984), Smith (1991), Delanty and 
Egin (eds.) (2003), and Lawson (2005a, chapter 1). On historical sociology in IR, see Hobden 
and Hobson (eds.) (2002).  
2 Although isolated examples of self-aware HSIR had appeared before this point, most 
notably in the work of Raymond Aron (1986).  
3 To some extent, this is a re-orientation towards sociology – many prominent classical IR 
scholars, including Stanley Hoffman (1960), Hans Morgenthau (1967) and Hedley Bull 
(1969) were scathing in their condemnation of economism. My thanks to Robbie Shilliam for 
making this point to me. 
4 This is also a danger for the wider enterprise of historical sociology itself. There is, as far as 
I know, no department of historical sociology anywhere in the world. Rather, the division and 
subdivision of academic subjects into schools, faculties, departments and disciplines has 
served to spread historical sociology broadly but not deeply. Without its own institutional 
base from which to build, what at first appears to be a feast of historical sociology can begin 
on closer inspection to look more like a famine.  
5 ‘Let the buyer beware’. 
6 This fuzziness can also promote a conservative bias – the grounds of John Krige’s critique 
of Fayerabend’s philosophy of science. Krige makes the point that, ‘if “anything goes”, then 
everything stays’. 
7 It should be made clear from the outset that this exercise, as Rosenau points out, is 
performed with the intention of fostering ‘healthy fervent’ rather than reducing its 
participants to ‘hopeless confusion’. 
8 Illustrative examples of fruitful interdisciplinarity include the concept of ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’, first mooted by the biologist Stephen Jay Gould to describe the switch-points in 
which long periods of stable reproduction within complex systems are punctuated by short, 
periods of rapid change. Gould’s concept has been usefully transported into numerous ‘soft’ 
academic sciences. Another pertinent example is the concept of ‘path dependence’ which 
originated in economic history and has become used in many disciplines to describe how 
small initial distinctions are amplified over time, becoming substantial schisms which are 
then difficult to reverse.  
9 For more on this, see Lawson (2005b) and Hobson (2005). 
10 It is important to note that these categories are proposed as analytical tools rather than as 
concrete explanatory categories. As such, borders between them should neither be overstated 
nor pushed too hard lest they become artificial, superficial and ultimately, absurd.  
11 Karl Popper led the twentieth century assault on induction in numerous texts (see, for 
example 1957). Popper organised a range of figures to join him in this task, including Albert 
Einstein, who was supportive enough to write in a letter to Popper (1962: 492), ‘theory 
cannot be fabricated out of the results of the observations, but must be invented’. 
12 The debate between the Austrian School and the German Historical School over scientific 
method became known as the Methodenstreit. In contrast to the former group, the German 
Historical School argued that, rather than focusing on universal truisms modelled on homo 
economicus, the line which was pursued by classical economists, economic processes 
operated within a social framework which was in turn shaped by cultural and historical 
forces. Hence, Gustav Schmoller and his associates favoured historical, comparative research 
that could uncover the distinctive properties of particular economic systems. The core debates 
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of the original Methodenstreit continue to reverberate around contemporary social science: 
the degree to which people’s actions are shaped by their social, historical and normative 
contexts as opposed to the view of individuals as universally driven homo politicus or homo 
economicus; preferences as exogenously generated by social institutions or the endogenous 
result of primal drives; rationality as a broad category embracing a range of motivations 
versus rationality as a narrow, limited realm of utility maximisation.   
13 Popper owes this analogy to the German poet, Novalis, ‘hypothesis are nets: only he who 
casts will catch’.  
14 As Stanley Hoffman (1960: 44) warns, many such theories are ‘a triumph of form over 
substance’. 
15 Of course, neorealism does contain a theory of systemic change, much of it originating in 
power transition theory, but only as this is carried through via great power war. On this, see 
Organski (1968), Organski and Kugler (1980), and Gilpin (1981).  
16 See, for example, Wohlforth (1994). 
17 On polarity, see Waltz (1979), Gilpin (1981), Walt (1987), Christensen and Snyder (1990), 
Layne (1993), Schweller (1998), Wohlforth (1999), and Waltz (2000); on soft balancing see 
Pape (2005), Paul (2005), and Brooks and Wohlforth (2005).  
18 On neorealist degeneration, see Vasquez (1997); on its progress see Elman (2003). A 
parallel argument is made in Philip Tetlock (2005). Tetlock argues that specialists are 
actually less good at predicting events in their field as non-experts, having a tendency to 
over-extrapolate from the past to the future. This is, in many ways, unsurprising. After all, 
experts are not neutral observers but partisans who have a vested interest in explaining and 
predicting a certain chain of events. As such, they have an in-built tendency towards 
motivated bias and groupthink, a point well made thirty years ago by Robert Jervis (1976) 
and more recently by Michael Freeden (2003). For illustrative examples of the struggles of 
some IR hedgehogs to incorporate unhelpful evidence and to predict major events in world 
politics, see the article by Robert Kaplan (1994), which predicted the imminent dissolution of 
Canada, and those by John Mearsheimer (1990, 1995) who, following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, predicted the break-up of the EU and the dissolution of NATO, and advocated 
ceding nuclear technology to Germany so that it could act as a deterrent against Soviet 
aggression (despite Mearsheimer’s concerns about the potential for a German invasion of 
Poland, and a war between Hungary and Romania).   
19 On the poverty of the former, see Spruyt (1994); on the latter, see Rosenberg (2005). 
20 Thanks to Justin Rosenberg for clarifying my reading of Giddens on this point. 
21 Of course, induction can never be ‘pure’ – even historians work within general (deductive) 
categories which act as orienting devices for their research. 
22 On causal narratives, see Suganami (1999); on superior stories, see Tilly (2005). 
23 When asked what he considered to be the agents of social change, Braudel is said to have 
replied: ‘forests and rivers’. 
24 Thompson (1965: 228) is worth quoting on this issue: ‘history is not a factory for the 
manufacture of grand theory, like some Concorde of the open air; nor is it an assembly line of 
the production of midget theories in series; nor yet is it some gigantic experimental station in 
which the theories of foreign manufacturers can be “applied”, “tested”, and “confirmed”. 
That is not its business at all. Its business it to recover, to explain and to understand its object: 
real history’. 
25 For more on this, see Lawson (2005a). 
26 On the benefits and difficulties of applying Lakatosian criteria to social science and, in 
particular, to IR, see Elman and Elman (eds.) (2003). 
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27 But not, of course, outside human agency. Although social structures such as capitalism, 
patriarchy or time appear to exist outside or beyond us, they are nothing more than social 
relations, formed as concrete historical conjunctures according to a particular time and space 
constellation. At their heart, therefore, is human agency. A central function of a historical 
sociological research programme is to examine the production, reproduction and, potentially, 
the transformation of these historical conjunctures.  
28 For Mann, this is the point in which ideology becomes transcendent (thereby containing the 
possibility of generating a radical alternative order) rather than imminent (concerned with 
legitimating the existing order). Karl Mannheim (1960) similarly writes that such a moment 
represents a potential shift from ideology to utopia.  
29 An excellent collection of articles on third-wave historical sociology can be found in 
Adams, Clemens and Orloff (eds.) (2005). 
30 For more on these issues, see Mills (1959) and Rosenberg (1994b). 
